

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3242

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12527

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15, 1978

(SALT TWO-1843)

SEmenov Statement, August 15, 1978

A SUBSTANTIVE AND AS YET NOT FULLY RESOLVED TASK  
ENTRUSTED TO THE DELEGATIONS IS THE PREPARATION OF A  
DRAFT TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND BASIC  
GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.

AT THE MAY 17, 1978 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION,  
GUIDED BY THE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING  
NEGOTIATIONS AT A DIFFERENT LEVEL IN MOSCOW IN APRIL 1978,  
TABLED NEW COMPROMISE PROPOSALS FOR THE THIRD AND FOURTH  
SECTIONS OF THAT DOCUMENT.

SUBSEQUENTLY, A NEW PROPOSAL ON THE JOINT STATEMENT  
WAS TABLED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AS WELL.

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THERE EMERGED A BASIS FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD  
RESOLVING THE AFOREMENTIONED ISSUE ON A MUTUALLY  
ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

TODAY I WILL SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS ON CERTAIN  
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE DRAFT

TEXT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES.

THE FIRST SECTION OF THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT RECORDS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON THE FUNDAMENTALLY IMPORTANT GUIDELINE THAT THE USSR AND THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER LIMITATION AND REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS FOR THEIR FURTHER QUALITATIVE LIMITATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED THAT IN FURTHERANCE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON QUESTION INVOLVED IN THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDUCING AND AVERTING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, TO SEEK MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN STRATEGIC STABILITY, BY, INTER ALIA, LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MOST DESTABILIZING TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THIS IS THE JOINT POSITION OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL FORMULATIONS, MOREOVER, FORMULATIONS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE JOINT APPROACH, IS NOT APPROPRIATE AND CAN ONLY DELAY THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN LIGHT OF THIS, IT IS ADVISABLE TO DELETE THE BRACKETED WORDS AT THE END OF THE FIRST SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, FOR THEY ARE SUPERFLUOUS.

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NOW WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND SECTION--ON VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXISTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THE WORDING OF THIS SECTION SHOULD PRECISELY AND CONSISTENTLY EMBODY THE THOUGHT THAT AGREEMENTS REGARDING MEASURES IN THE AREA OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT--AS IS THE CASE NOW AND, NATURALLY, AS WILL BE THE CASE IN THE FUTURE--TO APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PRECISELY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. BEARING IN MIND THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WORDING COULD BE ADDED HERE ON TAKING, AS APPROPRIATE, COOPERATIVE MEASURES, HOWEVER, OF COURSE, BY NO MEANS SO AS TO UNDERMINE OR PERMIT ANY EROSION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREED PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AND WILL NOT AGREE TO THIS.

NOW ON THE THIRD SECTION. THE REVISED WORDING FOR THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, TABLED AT THE

AUGUST 4, 1978 DRAFTING GROUP MEETING, MADE IT POSSIBLE TO BRING THE POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS. HOWEVER, THERE ALSO REMAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

THE SOVIET SIDE FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT ACHIEVING THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES INDICATED IN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE BASED ON AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. SUCH AN APPROACH HAS BEEN AT THE

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BASIS OF THE DISCUSSIONS FROM THE VERY INCEPTION OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THAT IS, SINCE 1969. THIS WAS REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED, AND AT ALL STAGES AND ON ALL LEVELS WAS CONSIDERED THE ONLY PROPER AND POSSIBLE APPROACH. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WE WILL ADDRESS NEW SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WILL BE MORE FAR-REACHING THAN THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY CURRENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION. PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON AN ACCOUNT FOR RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WILL GAIN IN IMPORTANCE IN WORKING OUT JOINT SOLUTIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THIS IS OF EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE TO BOTH SIDES.

AT THE JULY 27, 1978 MEETING THE U.S. DELEGATION

SAID THAT THE FORMULATIONS BEING WORKED OUT AND ALREADY AGREED FOR THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WILL ENSURE THAT "ALL CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION" IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH AN

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INTERPRETATION IS INDEFINITE AND DOES NOT MOVE US TOWARD ACHIEVING A JOINT SOLUTION.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT A PROVISION CONCERNING AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION MUST BE EMBODIED IN THE TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT, RATHER THAN BE VAGUELY IMPLIED THEREIN.

A PROVISION ON REDUCING THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES IS A MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE THIRD SECTION OF THE DRAFT. SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BECOME AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THEREFORE, REDUCING THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES WHICH EXERT A MOST DIRECT INFLUENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY, CANNOT BUT BE AN IMPORTANT AND INTEGRAL GUIDELINE FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALL, THE AGREED PROVISIONS REFER TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND TO THEIR QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. IT IS INCONTESTABLE THAT STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO REDUCE THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES. AS YOU KNOW, THIS QUESTION IS CONSTANTLY AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION. ATTEMPTS TO AVOID INDICATING SUCH A GUIDELINE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNJUSTIFIED, AND IN PRACTICAL TERMS WOULD BE FROUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF UNDERMINING THE STRUCTURE THAT THE SIDES SEEK TO ERECT AS A RESULT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS-- SALT-III. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A GUIDELINE FOR THE

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NEGOTIATIONS THERE COULD ARISE THE DANGER OF A CERTAIN NEW LOOP IN THE SPIRAL IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE, WITH ALL THE ENSUING UNFAVORABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY AND FOR MAINTAINING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES.

THE USSR DELEGATION REAFFIRMS THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSALS, TO BE INCLUDED IN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, REGARDING AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL RELEVANT FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND A REDUCTION OF THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO STRESS THAT THROUGHOUT THE TEXT, INCLUDING IN THE TITLE OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, IT IS ADVISABLE TO USE THE TERM "STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS"; THESE ARMS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. THIS DETERMINES THE SOVIET SIDE'S ATTITUDE TO THE PROPOSAL CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON SO-CALLED "STRATEGIC DEFENSES."

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSALS PROVIDE EVERYTHING NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINING ASPECTS OF THE DRAFT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS. OF COURSE, WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE U.S. SIDE IN THIS CONNECTION. EARLE

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## Message Attributes

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